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The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) was the most populous
effective regional trading area in history.  When it dissolved in 1991, the CMEA’s
members contained half a billion people (Table 1) - more than either the European
Union or NAFTA today.  As members of the CMEA, the Soviet Union, Vietnam,
Mongolia and the eastern European countries were largely insulated from the market-
driven international economy.
1  During the final decade of the twentieth century, a
major challenge was the reintegration of the formerly centrally planned economies
into the global trading system.  This paper analyses the progress of this reintegration,
focusing on the relationship between multilateral processes and regional integration
schemes, and taking the Central Asian countries as a particular case study.
A key issue, reflecting wider contemporary debates, has been the relationship between
participation in regional trading arrangements and adherence to the multilateral rule-
based system embodied in the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and
since 1995 in the World Trade Organization.  For practically all economies in
transition from central planning there have been plausible regional groupings, either
with neighbouring established market economies or among fellow transition
economies.   Most of the eastern European countries are negotiating accession to the
                                                
1 The CMEA’s members included the USSR, the centrally planned economies of eastern Europe,
Mongolia, Vietnam and Cuba.  Albania, whose membership became inoperative in 1961, and
Yugoslavia, as an associate member, did not participate in the planned trade (Pomfret, 1997, 115-6).  In
terms of reintegration into the global economy, the experience of Cambodia, China, Laos and Myanmar
raises similar issues to those facing the CMEA members; they will be referred to in this paper.  Cuba
and North Korea will be ignored.4
European Union (EU), the southeast Asian countries have all joined the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Central Asian countries are members
of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO).  Within the former Soviet Union
various regional arrangements have been initiated, and the Central European Free
Trade Area has six members.
Section 1 analyses relations between the GATT/WTO and the centrally planned
economies before and after their transition to more market-based economic systems.
Unfortunately the GATT diverged from a rule-based approach and established
precedents of differential treatment of some centrally planned economies in the 1960s
and 1970s.  These have become embodied in practices, especially with respect to
antidumping actions, which discriminate against non-market economies and which
continue to be applied to economies in transition from central planning.  Nevertheless,
the general picture is of the transition economies accepting WTO principles and
preferring to work within rather than outside the Organization.  By 2000, fourteen
transition economies had become WTO members and most of the remainder were at
some stage in the negotiating process, with only Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and
Yugoslavia among former CMEA members showing no interest (Table 2).
2
The second section reviews the degree to which the economies in transition have been
attracted to regional trading arrangements.  This could have been a major challenge to
the multilateral trading system because the big shift from central planning to market
economies in 1989-91 coincided with a surge in popularity for regionalism and of
                                                
2 The German Democratic Republic became the eastern Länder of Germany and hence inside the WTO
in 1990.  Myanmar, like Cuba, is a WTO member because it had been a GATT contracting party, in
both cases since 1948.  China, Laos and Cambodia are negotiating WTO accession.  Afghanistan and
North Korea have shown no interest in WTO membership.5
doubts about multilateralism.  China led the way against regionalism by pursuing and
sticking with a multilateral approach, even though China’s bid for accession to the
World Trade Organization was an arduous process from the initial application in 1986
to the conclusion of negotiations in 2000.
3   The other large transition economy,
Russia, has adopted a similar approach, although WTO membership is further away
and Russia has flirted with regional arrangements with other former Soviet republics.
4
By contrast, most of the Central and Eastern European transition economies,
including the Baltic countries, have oriented their external economic policies towards
the ultimate goal of joining the European Union (EU).  The path here is fairly clear
because the EU has established that, although there may be some limited room for
negotiation over transition periods to full membership, any new member must accept
the already established institutions and policies (the so-called acquis communautaire).
Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar have also pursued regionalism, but in
practice the situation is very different from that of the European transition economies
because ASEAN is a far looser organization than the EU and still effectively leaves
members scope to pursue their own national trade policies, as well as independent
polices in all other areas.
The Central Asian countries and Azerbaijan have been in some respects the most
interesting, because they have several potential regional options as well as
                                                
3 Little will be said in this paper about China’s WTO accession negotiations or their expected
consequences, because there is already a huge literature; see, for example, Anderson (1997), van der
Geest (1998) and Wei (1998).  Pomfret (1998) analyses the absence of regionalism in Asia, and
particularly China’s constancy to the non-discrimination principle.
4 Both Russia and China, together with North Korea, have been involved in the Tumen River project
which in some guises hopes to establish a sub-regional economic zone where the three countries
borders meet and in other guises envisages wider economic cooperation to include Mongolia, South
Korea and Japan.  The Tumen scheme, however, holds out no serious prospect of discriminatory trade
policies and its implications for the global economy are minimal, see Pomfret (1996a, 130-42).6
multilateralism.  This group of countries’ response to the trade policy challenges of
independence is analysed in more detail in the third section, with particular emphasis
on why, despite many paper proposals, they have in practice avoided regional trading
arrangements.
In sum, despite potential hurdles of reintegrating the formerly centrally planned
economies into the global trading system, the process went fairly smoothly in the final
decade of the twentieth century.  The transition economies have accepted rather than
challenged the existing principles of the world trading system embodied in the
GATT/WTO, and have generally pursued multilateral non-discriminatory trade
policies.   The only serious exceptions to this last generalization are the ten EU
candidates, for whom EU accession should be a guarantee of accepting WTO norms
rather than a source of negative regionalism.
1. Transition Economies and the GATT/WTO.
Formal trade relations between the market economies and the Soviet bloc were
dictated by political rather than economic considerations.  Favoured eastern European
states were allowed to become contracting parties to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) under ad hoc conditions – Poland in 1967, Romania in
1971 and Hungary in 1973 - but the USSR and Bulgaria were barred.
5  During the
1980s Soviet requests to participate in the forthcoming Uruguay Round were rejected.
The Bush-Gorbachev Malta summit in December 1989 signalled the end of the Cold
War, and ushered in a new era for trade relations.  Bush announced his support for the7
USSR to have observer status at GATT, and this was echoed a few days later by the
European Community.
6  A formal application for observer status was approved in
May 1990, although by chance it was subject to review in April 1992.  By then the
USSR had ceased to exist and the successor states’ relations with GATT were an open
question.
The acceptance of “good” non-market economies was a low point for the GATT.  The
ad hoc arrangements were quantity or results oriented, rather than rule-based.  The
special protocols were difficult to enforce, because circumstances change and targets
move, and non-fulfilment was difficult to punish; yet the state-trading countries were
now inside the GATT family.  This flaw was recognized by the early 1990s, and lay
behind insistence that new members must adhere to GATT rules, which were based
on principles of individual traders’ freedom to act within transparent rules and which
were only really compatible with a market-based economy.  There was, of course, a
grey area because in all GATT contracting parties state trading and public
procurement were facts of life, but the degree mattered.
China was a crucial test case, although the progress of its application was influenced
by political considerations.  China had initiated its open door policy in December
1978, and applied for GATT membership in 1986.  The Chinese economy was far
from a market economy and the trade regime was far from transparent in the 1980s, so
bargaining over the changes required as conditions for accession to the GATT was
                                                                                                                                           
5 Czechoslovakia was a founding signatory of the GATT in 1947, although its status had been passive
for most of the next four decades.  This paragraph draws on Haus (1992).
6 The USA, however, initially expressed reservations when the USSR made a formal application for
GATT observer status in March 1990, apparently as a result of inter-agency infighting, but it quickly
dropped its opposition.  Japan opposed the Soviet application due to dispute with the USSR over the
Kuril Islands.8
inevitable.  Especially after the June 1989 Tiananmen events, western leaders were
unwilling to be seen as being too positive towards China, and this included the GATT
negotiations in which China was seen as the supplicant.  In the USA in particular
trade relations with China became highly politicized, with the annual renewal of
China’s MFN status becoming an opportunity for highlighting China’s human rights
record rather than reviewing the country’s progress towards a market economy with a
transparent trade regime.
The unexpected length of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations
complicated the situation in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  The Round was launched
in 1986, and on several occasions the talks came close to breaking down, threatening
GATT’s very existence.  For the major trading nations, the Uruguay Round’s ultimate
success clearly took precedence over accession negotiations.
In 1994 the Uruguay Round was successfully concluded, and among its consequences
was the superseding of GATT by a new World Trade Organization (WTO).  All
GATT contracting parties became WTO members at the start of 1995.
7  Once in
place, the new organization took up outstanding and new applications for
membership.  For the first few years, however, it appeared difficult for countries with
economies in transition from central planning to get through the admission process.
Michalopoulos (1999) argues that the procedure was too complex, and exceeded the
administrative capacities of the applicants, as well as of the WTO Secretariat.
Langhammer and Lücke (1999) question this interpretation, and point to substantive
                                                
7 Hungary, the Czech and Slovak republics (who had divorced in 1993), and Poland and Romania (who
renegotiated the special protocols under which they had entered GATT in 1967 and 1971) were charter
members of the WTO.  Slovenia and Bulgaria, whose GATT applications had been relatively
straightforward and were far advanced, became WTO members in 1995 and 1996.9
issues which needed to be resolved before a transition economy could reasonably be
admitted to the WTO.  With the hindsight of just a few extra years, however, the pace
of WTO accession looks more impressive, with Mongolia, the Kyrgyz Republic,
Latvia, Estonia, Georgia, Albania and Croatia all completing the formalities between
1998 and 2000 (Table 2), not to mention the long-awaited breakthrough in China’s
accession negotiations.
Why does WTO membership matter?  In principle, membership guarantees rights as
well as imposing obligations.  Yet most of the transition economies have been
unilaterally granted the main right of members, MFN treatment by all other members,
and in many cases they face the lower Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) tariff
rate.
8
More importantly, WTO membership should provide some protection against
imposition of non-tariff barriers.  During the 1990s transition economies suffered
especially from anti-dumping actions, where they faced a double penalty of not
having WTO protection and being treated as non-market economies.
9  The latter
actually seems to be the more severe handicap because “surrogate” or “analogue”
countries’ costs and exchange rates can be used, somewhat arbitrarily, in calculation
of dumping margins.
10  The WTO provides legal justification for special treatment of
                                                
8 WTO membership does, however, ensure MFN treatment as a right rather than a unilaterally granted
privilege.  As a GATT/WTO member China would have avoided having to face the hurdle of annual
renewal of MFN status by the USA during the 1980s and 1990s.  As a WTO member Azerbaijan
should gain MFN treatment from the USA, where this status has been blocked by the Armenian lobby.
9 Michalopoulos (1999, 20) shows that in the first three years of the WTO’s operation (1995-7) both
non-WTO and non-market economies were more likely to be subject of anti-dumping actions and were
more likely to be the targets of definitive anti-dumping duties.
10 The practice dates back to differential treatment of the non-market economies which joined the
GATT in the 1960s and 1970s.  A landmark case involved a 1975 antidumping action against Polish
golf carts imported into the USA.  In that case the constructed values, based on Spanish prices, led to a
determination that the golf carts were not being sold below fair value, but in subsequent cases exporters10
non-market economies,
11 whether or not they are WTO members.   Although the
presence of market institutions has become an important prerequisite for admission
and their extent a major negotiating point, WTO membership is still not considered
sufficient evidence that a country has a market economy.
12  Nevertheless, WTO
membership does offer greater prospect for fairer treatment and some remedy under
dispute resolution mechanisms.  Another area of non-tariff barriers where being inside
the WTO may make a difference is the Uruguay Round Agreement on Textiles and
Clothing, by which all import quotas under the Multifbre Arrangement are to be
eliminated by 2005.
WTO membership also operates as a signalling device, or to provide a road map for
reform and legally bind governments to liberal policies.  For the European transition
economies aspiring to EU membership, WTO membership is an essential way station.
It proves intent to create a market economy and to abide by international trade law.
Nine of the ten countries which have formally applied for EU membership (Table 3)
are already WTO members, and Lithuania is not far away from completing its
accession negotiations.
13
                                                                                                                                           
complained that the surrogate was chosen after the case was opened and the choice was biased towards
a ruling of unfair trade.
11 Article 2.7 of the Antidumping Agreement refers to the second Supplementary Provision in
paragraph 1 of Article VI in Annex 1 to GATT 1994, which permits different treatment “in the case of
imports from a country which has a complete or substantially complete monopoly of its trade and
where all domestic prices are fixed by the State” and which was interpreted in the original Polish and
Hungarian accession negotiations to permit a surrogate country methodology (Palmeter, 1998, 116-7).
It continues to be invoked even though by the late 1990s in very few countries were all prices fixed by
the state and, as Palmeter stresses, “the word “all” with regard to control over domestic prices is quite
specific”.
12 The EU publishes annually a list of non-market economies for the purpose of antidumping and
safeguard actions, and the 1999 list included Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia,
Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Mongolia, North Korea, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Vietnam.  The USA has no formal list and proceeds on a case by case basis,
but seems in practice to consider the same list of countries to be non-market economies.  The Kyrgyz
Republic and Mongolia were already WTO members in 1999.11
Elsewhere, transition economies generally show a desire for WTO membership, but
have been less willing to pursue policies which will ensure an easy passage.  The
exceptions (Mongolia and the Kyrgyz Republic) are small countries committed to
liberal policies, in part because they have been major aid recipients from donors
which require such policies.  Other small economies (Albania, Georgia and Croatia)
have passed through the admission process because there has been little concern over
their impact on the world trading system.  On the other hand, the existing WTO
members have been stricter towards larger applicants, and some of the larger or more
cautious transition economies may have been deterred by the hard line taken by the
existing WTO members.
14  Nevertheless, even the act of negotiating signals to
potential foreign investors, international financial institutions and others that a
country is contemplating acceptance of WTO conditions and is committed to a
market-based economy.  Only Yugoslavia, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have shown
no formal interest in WTO accession.
2. The Attraction of Regionalism
The former members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)
experienced a common pattern of trade performance after embarking on the transition
to a market economy.  For all CMEA members except Vietnam, both total output and
exports fell in the early 1990s.  The initial policy response, in 1990-3, was often
                                                                                                                                           
13 The draft Working Party report on Lithuania’s application was completed in October 1998.
14 Existing WTO members have taken a strict position towards transition countries insisting on
fulfilment of conditions that many existing members do not fulfil and on meeting all commitments
before entry.  It is generally believed that the transition applicants are expected to offer an average
bound tariff on industrial imports of ten percent, which is double the OECD average, but well below
that of many existing WTO members, eg. India’s average bound rate is 34 percent (Langhammer and
Lücke, 1999).  The hard line may have been counterproductive in some cases, with Belarus, Russia and
Ukraine stalling or even back-tracking on commitments made at a previous stage in the negotiations.12
illiberal as governments not only sought to protect import-competing activities but
also imposed export taxes and other restrictions to prevent resources from being
drained out of the country.  Trade was also hampered by confusing currency
arrangements and payment mechanisms in the former Soviet Union, and these could
only really be sorted out after countries exited from the ruble zone in 1993 (Pomfret,
1996a, 118-29).
The diversification of trade partners from the old CMEA patterns initially took place
more slowly than expected, but did proceed steadily during the 1990s.  Export growth
followed a similar pattern.
15  Clearly the disorganization arising from the collapse of
central planning as a control mechanism and the time needed to establish market-
supporting institutions and create new networks led to time lags (Blanchard and
Kremer, 1997).  In econometric studies of the growth and diversification of transition
countries’ exports during the first half of the 1990s, there was clearly a bifurcation
between the European transition economies and the other former USSR countries (the
remaining transition economies were generally excluded from the econometric
exercises).  The best single explanatory variable is distance from Frankfurt
(Havrylyshyn and Al-Atrash, 1998).  Most observers interpreted this in terms of the
EU-orientation of the European transition economies, although some invoked the
political economy of protection literature to explain why the more concentrated
industries in the former Soviet Union led to protectionist trade regimes (Leidy and
Ibrahim, 1996, 12; citing Olson, 1965, and Pincus 1975).
                                                
15 Influential early policy and research documents were Michalopoulos and Tarr (1994), de Ménil
(1995), Kaminski, Wang and Winters (1996), and ECE (1998).13
In 1989-91 when Communism collapsed in Europe and the Soviet Union, the major
trade policy issue facing the global economy was the challenge of regionalism.
16  The
Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations appeared to be stalled.  In western
Europe, attention was focussed on creating a single European market by 1992.  In the
Americas, the North American Free Trade Agreement was being negotiated among
the USA, Canada and Mexico, and the Mercosur treaty was signed in the South.  In
Asia pressures for regionalism were weaker, but the ASEAN Free Trade Area was
about to be launched and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) members
discussed open regionalism.
The centrally planned economies were not immune from this trend, although they
were happy enough to allow the old organization, the CMEA, to fade away after 1989
and formally dissolve in 1991.  Attempts to partially reconstruct old trading patterns
on a regional basis were made by the former Soviet republics and by some east
European countries, but these were half-hearted and always secondary to other trade
policy strategies.  Much more important were attempts by the countries in transition to
a market economy to link themselves to neighbouring market economies.  This was
especially true for the European transition economies, and to a lesser extent for the
southeast Asian transition economies and for the Islamic transition economies of
Central Asia and the Caucasus.
The collapse of Communism was viewed by many east Europeans as an opportunity
to re-establish their position as citizens of normal democratic European countries.
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary joined the Organization for Economic
                                                
16 Pomfret (1997, 128-55 and 207-39) describes the schemes mentioned in this paragraph and the14
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the North American Treaty Organization
(NATO) during the 1990s.
17  Most of all, these three countries aspired to membership
in the European Union, and together with Estonia, Slovenia and Cyprus were in the
”first wave” of applicants with whom the EU opened negotiations in March 1998.
The second wave of EU candidates, containing Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania,
Slovakia and Malta began negotiations in February 2000.
The twelve EU members were initially slow to respond to these aspirations.  The
seventeen million people in the German Democratic Republic were automatically
absorbed into the EU with German reunification in 1990, but the prospect of over a
hundred million new EU citizens in the ten applicant transition countries was more
difficult to digest.  Moreover, in the early 1990s the EU was absorbed by the single
market project, the 1992 crisis in the European Monetary System and subsequent
moves towards the common currency, and expansion to include three established
market economies (Austria, Finland and Sweden) as new members in 1995.
Association agreements were signed with transition economies and these were
transformed into so-called Europe Agreements in 1994-5 (Table 3), but they fell far
short of the would-be members’ aspirations.
During the first half of the 1990s, the most developed European transition economies
(Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia) formed their own trade bloc.  The
Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) was signed in 1992, but this was
always a stepping stone towards the goal of EU membership.
18  The Baltic countries,
                                                                                                                                           
theoretical arguments developed in support of the New Regionalism.
17 The Slovak Republic has also applied for OECD membership.
18 The original signatories were Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland.  Slovenia joined in 1996.  Half
of CEFTA trade was made tariff-free in 1994 and subsequent negotiations aimed at a full free trade15
which kept outside the successor organization to the Soviet Union, the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), discussed regional integration proposals
but they never progressed far.  More important, especially for Estonia, was the
opening up of links to their Nordic neighbours, which provided them with advocates
for EU membership once Finland and Sweden were inside the EU club.
At the June 1993 meeting of the EU Council in Copenhagen the heads of state agreed
that the associated countries could join the EU once they had achieved institutional
stability  (guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for
protection of minorities), a functioning market economy, and ability to take on the
obligations of EU membership.  Between 1994 and 1996 ten transition economies
lodged formal applications for EU membership, and as mentioned above negations
began in 1998 and 2000.  The current position is that there will not necessarily be
waves of enlargement and that candidates will be admitted, as they are ready, after the
end of 2002.
19
Although the EU was seen by some of the more impatient candidates, notably Poland,
as dragging its collective feet during the 1990s, the decade was not wasted time
because the leading candidate countries were able to implement the time-consuming
measures necessary as prerequisites for accession.  By 2000 the ten applicants were
all WTO members or close to being so, and all ranked highly on the various
liberalization or “good institutions” indices published by international organizations
such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (in its annual
                                                                                                                                           
area by 2002, but once EU accession negotiations had formally opened in 1998 EU trade arrangements
superseded CEFTA.16
Transition Report) or the International Monetary Fund (in its September 2000 World
Economic Outlook).
EU membership is now a matter of when rather than if for most European transition
economies.  Some may balk at the conditions or wish to remain independent, so that
the EU’s eastern border will remain in flux for some time.  For those who do join, EU
membership will not conflict much with integration into the global as well as the
regional economy.  The EU has long been accepted as a single unit for the purposes of
international trade negotiations and, with the deepening of the euro arrangements,
notably the withdrawal of national currencies in 2002, most EU members will operate
as a common currency area.  Despite some illiberal practices, the EU is generally an
open trading bloc and membership is more likely to cement liberal policies than non-
membership.
20
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia have taken an ostensibly similar stance with respect to
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).  The six ASEAN members
were thriving market economies whose historic economic links to the southeast Asian
centrally planned economies had been broken amid the military conflicts of the 1960s
and early 1970s.  The ASEAN six, like the EU twelve, were preoccupied with their
internal regionalism projects in the late 1980s and early 1990s when their neighbours
were initiating the transition to a market economy, but the ASEAN Free Trade Area
                                                                                                                                           
19 Developments up to 2000 are described in the IMF’s September 2000 World Economic Outlook, Box
4.1.  Temprano-Arroyo and Feldman (1999) review the institutional requirements of EU membership.
The EU website http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement provides progress reports.
20 Examples of the illiberal policies emerged during WTO accession negotiations when Estonia chose
to bind its tariffs on some agricultural goods above the current applied tariffs solely to allow scope for
adoption of the EU common external trade policy.  Nevertheless, the EU common commercial policy
and EU policies in other areas such as capital flows are more liberal and far more conducive to
integration into the global economy than are the more restrictive policies of some of the southeast
European transition countries, not to mention those of CIS members such as Belarus or Ukraine.17
(AFTA) which began operation in 1992 was a much weaker form of regionalism than
the EU common market and ASEAN was far from accepting the political integration
which underlay the EU project for many Europeans.
The looser organization meant less stringent admission criteria, with nothing like the
Copenhagen Criteria to prevent non-democracies with imperfect market economies
from joining ASEAN.  Vietnam joined ASEAN in July 1995, and Laos and Myanmar
in July 1997, when Cambodia was also scheduled to join, but Cambodia’s formal
accession was delayed for a year after the anti-democratic coup.   Despite this gesture,
none of the four new members is a democracy, and the admission of Myanmar
(Burma) in the face of strong disapproval by the USA and EU provided a clear-cut
signal of the lack of political prerequisites.  The enlargement to ten members
completed ASEAN’s “natural” geographical expansion to include all Asian countries
south of China and east of Bangladesh and India, but left the association as a disparate
group with little prospect of pursuing common policies in the near term (Pomfret,
1996b; 2000a).
Joining ASEAN has few direct policy implications, but it has been a non-trivial signal
on the part of the southeast Asian transition economies.  As ASEAN stands at the start
of the twenty-first century, membership is not a commitment to regionalism.  There is
no formal commitment to introduce liberal trade policies, because ASEAN has neither
a common external commercial policy nor internal free trade, let alone uniform
measures in areas such as currency convertibility or capital flows.  Progress on AFTA
has been sporadic, and the four newest members of ASEAN are explicitly allowed to
move at a slower pace than the other ASEAN members.  The extent to which18
Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar reform their formerly planned economies to
become open economies integrated into the global system remains a matter of
domestic decision-making.  Nevertheless, the new members have signalled that they
belong in a group of market economies, and they will be under pressure within
ASEAN to liberalize their intra-regional trade.  Given that the new members are
unlikely to want to discriminate in favour of their ASEAN partners, such pressures if
effective will lead to multilateral trade liberalization.
21
3. Regional Integration in Central and Western Asia
The successor states to the Soviet Union have made some attempts to maintain
existing trade relations through regional arrangements, but these have been feeble
measures with little practical impact.  In 1992-3 the main concern was to retain a
common currency in order to minimize payments problems, but the ruble zone had
collapsed by November 1993.  Since then, post-Soviet trade patterns have diversified
continuously, and no serious attempt to stop this trend by introducing regional trading
arrangements has been implemented.
The twelve non-Baltic successor states to the USSR formed the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS), but that organization has never had any serious economic
content.  In September 1993 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz
Republic, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed an agreement to set up
                                                
21 An important reason why ASEAN has not progressed far towards internal free trade is the similarity
of the members’ economic specialization in raw materials and labour-intensive manufactures.  The
ASEAN members are unwilling to favour the least-cost internal supplier of capital-intensive of
knowledge-intensive goods, because that supplier is unlikely to be competitive with the global least-
cost supplier.  Thus, it is likely that any internal trade induced by preferential tariffs will be trade
diverting rather than trade creating.  Similar concerns will also be felt by the new members.19
an economic union; Georgia signed some of the provisions, and Ukraine became an
associate member.
22  Thus, eleven of the twelve non-Baltic Soviet successor states
indicated commitment to some form of regional economic arrangement, but neither
this nor any subsequent proposal involving a majority of CIS members made any
progress (Sakwa and Webber, 1999, 386-90).
On a political level, the CIS became fractured in the second half of the 1990s.  In
January 1995 Belarus, Kazkahstan and Russia signed a customs union agreement,
which the Kyrgyz Republic also signed in March 1996 when it became known as the
Union of Four.
23  With Russia clearly the dominant partner, Russia’s tariff
presumably would be the putative common external tariff, but apart from steps
towards a Belarus-Russia economic union nothing has been implemented.  The tariff
bindings in the Kyrgyz Republic’s 1998 WTO accession agreement are in conflict
with the would-be customs union because it is difficult to imagine Russia agreeing to
such a liberal external trade policy and the Kyrgyz Republic is no longer able to raise
its tariffs to the Russian level.
24
In late 1996 and 1997, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine, later joined by Moldova,
began to coordinate their strategies in security negotiations, and this became
formalized in a joint communiqué in October 1997.  In April 1999 Uzbekistan became
the fifth member of the alignment, which became known as GUUAM.  Although not
                                                
22 Georgia and Turkmenistan only formally joined the CIS in December 1993.  Turkmenistan’s main
foreign policy principle has been strict neutrality, which it has interpreted as allowing only limited
cooperation with the CIS, even to the extent of not supplying statistics to the CIS statistical agency.
23 Tajikistan became the fifth member of the Union in February 1999.  On the Union of Four, or Five,
see Michalopoulos and Tarr (1997) and Pasznyak (2000).
24 A similar conflict could arise from Kazakhstan’s WTO negotiations.  According to Webber (1997,
56), Kazakhstan’s President Nazarbayev indicated in September 1996 that Kazakhstan would leave the
customs union when it acceded to the WTO.20
having any economic content beyond coordination of infrastructure plans, the
GUUAM grouping (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova) is
operating explicitly as a counter to Russian hegemony (Pavliuk, 2000).  Thus, the CIS
has split into two groups of five, plus two floaters (Armenia and Turkmenistan).
The five Central Asian successor states have drawn up many plans for regional
cooperation among themselves.  They inevitably must cooperate on some non-trade
matters such as the desiccation of the Aral Sea and on developing transport and
pipeline routes, but attempts to set up a regional trading agreement have had little
impact.  In April 1994 Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan signed a
treaty for the establishment of an integrated economic space.  In March 1998
Tajikistan, which had previously had observer status, became a full participant in the
scheme which became known as the Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC).
Trade within the CAEC, however, declined over the 1990s, and in most areas the
members pursued independent policies without regard to intra-CAEC cooperation and
at times in contradiction to stated CAEC policies and goals (Pomfret, 2000b).
A fundamental problem in Central Asia is that despite a common historical heritage
and a legacy of tightly interwoven economies from the Soviet era, the five countries’
resource endowments are more competing than complementary (Pomfret, 1995).
From 1865 until 1991 Central Asian agriculture was developed as a cotton
monoculture to supply Russian mills.  The energy and mineral endowment of the
region, which provides the other main economic foundations, is across a fairly limited
range of resources.  Cotton, oil, gas and minerals are all sold (to the extent that this is
not limited by the inherited pipeline network) at world prices and the exporters see no21
benefit from preferential regional arrangements.   In addition to the lack of a strong
economic basis for regional arrangements, there are also political fissures.  The two
largest countries, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, compete for regional hegemony.
Tajikistan has been riven by civil war for most of the period since 1991.
Turkmenistan is committed to a concept of neutrality which precludes membership in
the CAEC.
The only significant attempt by CIS countries to form a regional trading arrangement
with neighbouring market economies has been the accession of the Islamic former
Soviet republics to the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO).  Plans for
regional cooperation among ECO’s three founding members, Iran, Pakistan and
Turkey, had made little progress before 1992.  The May 1991 Protocol on Preferential
Tariffs covered few goods and offered small preferential margins.  The dissolution of
the USSR breathed new life into ECO when six former Soviet republics plus
Afghanistan joined ECO in November 1992, forming a bloc of the non-Arab Islamic
countries west of Bangladesh, with a combined population of over 350 million.
25
Despite attempts to improve infrastructure and transit arrangements, ECO did little
during the 1990s beyond acting as a regional talking shop  In this regional confidence-
building respect ECO has had some similarity to ASEAN, and like the ASEAN
countries ECO’s members were unwilling to match declarations of intent to have a
preferential trading arrangement with actual trade liberalization measures (Pomfret,
1999).  A major reason for this failure has to do with the three founding members,
who have acted more like competitors in Central Asia than cooperative partners22
playing a positive-sum game; all three viewed a putative customs union in terms of
extending the size of the protected market for their own industries.
26  In addition, the
similarity of the ten ECO members’ export mixes has limited intra-ECO trade flows,
and reinforced the lack of will for discriminatory trade liberalization.
There are also problems of overlapping arrangements which hinder ECO’s ability to
progress along the route of preferential trading arrangements.  In January 1996
Turkey formed a customs union with the EU, which limits Turkey’s ability to alter its
tariff rates and Turkey notified the ECO Secretariat that its obligations to the EU
would override any ECO commitments.  Since then, Turkey’s relationships with the
EU have fluctuated, but the legal situation remains unchanged.
27  Pakistan faces a
potential conflict between commitments under the preferential agreements reached
within the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and any
made within ECO, but in practice SAARC tariff preferences are even more innocuous
than those within ECO.  For much progress towards an ECO regional trading
arrangement, a greater obstacle is probably the Kyrgyz Republic’s tariff bindings
agreed to during the country’s WTO accession negotiations.  These tariff rates limit
the Kyrgyz Republic’s freedom to offer substantial tariff preferences to partners in a
preferential trading arrangement and, as in the Union of Five, put low limits on any
common external tariffs.
                                                                                                                                           
25 The six countries were Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan.  The Turkish Muslim Community of Cyprus is not an ECO member, but its representatives
often attend ECO meetings.
26 The view of a regional arrangement as allowing economies of scale for import substitution underlay
the many Latin American integration schemes during the 1960s and 1970s, none of which had any
success; members wanted access to partners’ market for their uncompetitive industries, but were
unwilling to open their own markets in a discriminatory way to their partners’ uncompetitive industries.23
A striking feature of the Central Asian countries’ trade policies since independence
has been the commitment to either autonomy or multilateralism.  Despite common
regional problems, or predictions that the new independent countries would seek to
renew fractured cultural connections with southern neighbours, or concerns that their
national economies were simply too small, they have avoided any significant
commitment to regional trading arrangements.  Turkmenistan with its fierce neutrality
and Tajikistan with its civil discord are perhaps special cases; neither of these
countries has even initiated negotiations for WTO accession.  Nevertheless, even the
more “normal” new independent states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic and
Uzbekistan, although signing regional agreements, have not been tempted to make
any practical commitment to regionally discriminatory trade policies.
4. Conclusions
This paper has argued that the integration of transition economies into the global
trading system has been surprisingly successful.  Almost all the countries in transition
from central planning have accepted the WTO rule-based system in principle, even if
there are variations in trade policies and performance.  In particular, the potential
danger of regionalism proving more attractive than multilateralism has not
eventuated.
The temptations of the EU, ASEAN and ECO pose little threat to adherence to
multilateralism, albeit for different reasons.  Transition economies joining the EU will
have discriminatory trade policies, but within a basically liberal common trade policy,
                                                                                                                                           
27 Turkey has promoted the shuttle trade, apparently with some measures favouring traders from24
while members of ASEAN and ECO are in organizations whose regional integration
remains weak.  The other formerly centrally planned economies have shown little
interest in regionalism in their external economic relations.  China is an APEC
member, but its post-1978 trade policies have clearly been based on multilateralism,
with WTO membership as the top priority since the mid-1980s.  Since Mongolia
emerged from the Soviet sphere of influence in 1990, after having become so closely
integrated that it was often referred to as the sixteenth Soviet republic, it has shown no
interest in preferential bilateral economic relations.  The Balkan countries which are
not (yet?) EU applicants have been too embroiled in regional problems to give much
attention to the matter.
The fairly smooth reintegration of formerly centrally planned economies is significant
for people beyond these countries’ borders.  The global trading system should include
as much of the world’s population as possible, and the effective absence of China and
the CMEA countries was a big gap from the 1940s until the 1980s.  More universal
participation strengthens the global trading system and all participants in that system
benefit from the strengthening.
                                                                                                                                           
Central Asia (Khasanova, 1998, 184).  The shopper-tourism phenomenon, however, although probably
large relative to current trade flows of some Central Asian countries, has limited long-term potential.25














Slovenia 2 6,540 2 9,890
Hungary 10 2,970 10 4,650
Estonia 2 2,760 1 3,480
Czech Rep. 10 2,450 10 5,060
Latvia 3 1,930 2 2,470
Slovak Rep. 5 1,930 5 3,590
Poland 38 1,910 39 3,960
Lithuania 4 1,910 4 2,620
German Dem.
Rep.
17 LM n.a. n.a.
Eastern Europe
Belarus 10 2,930 10 2,630
Russia 149 2,510 147 2,270
Ukraine 52 1,820 50 750
Balkan &
Caucasus
Bulgaria 9 1,330 8 1,380
Moldova 4 1,300 4 370
Romania 23 1,130 22 1,520
Georgia 6 850 5 620
Armenia 4 780 4 490
Azerbaijan 7 740 8 550
Albania 3 LM 3 870
Croatia 5 LM 4 4,580
Macedonia FYR 2 LM 2 1,690
Yugoslavia 11 LM 11 LM
Bosnia &
Hercegovina
4 L 4 LM
Asia
Kazakhstan 17 1,680 15 1,230
Turkmenistan 4 1,230 5 660
Uzbekistan 22 850 25 720
Kyrgyz Rep 5 820 5 300
Mongolia 2 LM 3 350
Tajikistan 6 490 6 290
Vietnam 69 L 78 37026
Non-CMEA
China 1,162 470 1,250 780
Laos 4 250 5 280
North Korea 23 LM 23 L
Afghanistan 22 L 26 L
Cambodia 9 L 12 260
Myanmar 44 L 45 L
Source: World Bank data from World Development Report 1994, 162-3 & 228, and
World Development Report 2000/2001, 274-5 & 316.
Notes: n.a. = not available in the source;
since 1990 the German Democratic Republic forms the eastern Länder of
Germany;
in 1992  lower income (L ) is less than $675 and lower middle income (LM)
$676 to $2,695; in 1998 L is $755 or less, LM is $756 to $2,995.27
Table 2: WTO Status of Former CMEA Members
WTO Status
Central & Eastern Europe
Czechoslovakia Original GATT signatory
Poland Joined GATT 1967
Romania Joined GATT 1971
Hungary Joined GATT 1973
Slovenia Joined WTO 1995
Bulgaria Joined WTO 1996
Albania Joined WTO 2000
Croatia Joined WTO 2000/1




Kyrgyz Rep Joined WTO 1998
Latvia Joined WTO 1999
Estonia Joined WTO 1999













Mongolia Joined WTO 1998
Vietnam negotiating
Note and Source: up-to-date membership information is provided on the WTO
website www.wto.org28







Bulgaria March 1993 February 1995 December 1995
Czech
Republic
October 1993 February 1995 January 1996
Estonia June 1995 - November 1995
Hungary December 1991 February 1994 March 1994
Latvia June 1995 - October 1995
Lithuania June 1995 - December 1995
Poland December 1991 February 1994 April 1994
Romania February 1993 February 1995 June 1995
Slovakia October 1993 February 1995 June 1995
Slovenia June 1996 February 1999 June 1996
Source: From the European Union’s webpage (on 22
nd. September 2000) at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/intro/index.htm29
References
Anderson, Kym (1997): Complexities of China’s WTO Accession, The World
Economy, 20(6), 749-72.
Blanchard, Olivier, and Michael Kremer (1997): Disorganization, The Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 112, November, 1091-1126.
de Ménil, Georges (1995) : Trade Patterns in Transition Economies : A Comparison
of European and Asian Experience, DELTA Document no.95-19, Ecole Normale
Supérieure, Paris.
ECE (1998): The Foreign Trade of Transition Economies, Economic Survey of
Europe 1998, No.3, Economic Commission for Europe, United Nations New York
NY, 71-105.
Haus, Leah (1992): Globalizing the GATT: The Soviet Union’s Successor States,
Eastern Europe, and the International Trading System. The Brookings Institution,
Washington DC.
Havrylyshyn, Oleh, and Hassan Al-Atrash (1998): Opening Up and Geographic
Diversification of Trade in Transition Economies, IMF Working Paper WP/98/22,
International Monetary Fund, Washington DC, February.
Kaminski, Bruno, Zhen Kun Wang and Alan Winters (1996): Export Performance in
Transition Economies, Economic Policy, 23, 423-42.
Khasanova, Markhamat (1998): Kazakhstan: Foreign Trade Policy, in Boris Rumer
and Stanislav Zhukov, eds., Central Asia: The Challenge of Independence.
M.E.Sharpe, Armonk NY, 169-207.
Langhammer, Rolf, and Matthias Lücke (1999): WTO Accession Issues, The World
Economy, 22(6), August, 837-73.
Leidy, Michael, and Ali Ibrahim (1996): Recent Trade Policies and an Approach to
Further Reform in the Baltics, Russia, and Other Countries of the Former Soviet
Union,  IMF Working Paper WP/96/71, International Monetary Fund, Washington
DC, July.
Michalopoulos, Constantine (1999): The Integration of Transition Economies into the
World Trading System, Working Paper WPS 2182, The World Bank, Washington
DC, September.
Michalopoulos, Constantine, and David Tarr (1994): Trade in the New Independent
States, Studies of Economies in Transformation 13, World Bank Washington DC.
Michalopoulos, Constantine, and David Tarr (1997): The Economics of Customs
Unions in the Commonwealth of Independent States, Policy Research Working Paper
1786, World Bank Washington DC, June.30
Olson, Mancur (1965): The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory
of Groups. Harvard University Press: Cambridge MA.
Palmeter, David (1998): The WTO Antidumping Agreement and the Economies in
Transition, in Thomas Cottier and Petros Mavroidis, eds., State Trading in the
Twenty-First Century.  University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor MI, 115-9.
Pavliuk, Oleksandr (2000): GUUAM: The Maturing of Political Grouping into
Economic Cooperation, in Renata Dwan and Oleksandr Pavliuk, eds., Building
Security in the New States of Eurasia: Subregional Cooperation in the Former Soviet
Space. M.E.Sharpe, Armonk NY, 33-56.
Paznyak, Vyachaslau (2000): The Customs Union of Five and the Russia-Belarus
Union, in Renata Dwan and Oleksandr Pavliuk, eds., Building Security in the New
States of Eurasia: Subregional Cooperation in the Former Soviet Space. M.E.Sharpe,
Armonk NY, 57-85.
Pincus, Jonathan (1975): Pressure Groups and the Pattern of Tariffs, Journal of
Political Economy, 83(4), 757-78.
Pomfret, Richard (1995): The Economies of Central Asia. Princeton University Press,
Princeton NJ.
Pomfret, Richard (1996a): Asian Economies in Transition: Reforming Centrally
Planned Economies. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK.
Pomfret, Richard (1996b): ASEAN: Always at the Crossroads? Journal of the Asia
Pacific Economy, 1 (3), 365-90.
Pomfret, Richard (1997): The Economics of Regional Trading Arrangements.
Clarendon Press, Oxford UK.
Pomfret, Richard (1998): Regionalism in Asia and its Impact on Sino-European
Trade, in Roger Strange, Jim Slater and Limin Wang, eds., Trade and Investment in
China: The European Perspective. Routledge, London UK, 81-97.
Pomfret, Richard (1999): Central Asia Turns South? Trade Relations in Transition.
The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London UK, and The Brookings
Institution, Washington DC.
Pomfret, Richard (2000a): Enlargement to Include Formerly Centrally Planned
Economies: ASEAN and the European Union Compared, in Roger Strange, Jim Slater
and Corrado Molteni, eds., The European Union and ASEAN: Trade and Investment
Issues. Macmillan, Basingstoke UK, 225-37.
Pomfret, Richard (2000b): Trade Initiatives in Central Asia: The Economic
Cooperation Organization and the Central Asian Economic Community, in Renata
Dwan and Oleksandr Pavliuk, eds., Building Security in the New States of Eurasia:
Subregional Cooperation in the Former Soviet Space. M.E.Sharpe, Armonk NY, 11-
32.31
Sakwa, Richard, and Mark Webber (1999): The Commonwealth of Independent
States, 1991-19998; Stagnation and Survival, Europe-Asia Studies, 51(3), 379-415.
Temprano-Arroyo, Heliodoro, and Robert Feldman (1999): Selected Transition and
Mediterranean Countries: An Institutional Primer on EMU and EU Accession,
Economics of Transition, 7(3), 741-806.
van der Geest, Willem (1998): Bringing China into the Concert of Nations: An
Analysis of its Accession to the WTO, Journal of World Trade, 32 (3), 99-116.
Webber, Mark (1997): CIS Integration Trends: Russia and the Former Soviet South.
The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London UK, and The Brookings
Institution, Washington DC.
Wei, Zhao (1998): China’s WTO Accession Commitments and Prospects, Journal of
World Trade, 32 (2), 51-76.